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Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory
Organizations Through an Informed
Association Statute
Jennifer Gerarda Brown'
[Wihen a "message" is kept secret, many individuals will invest in an
organization they would not have joined had they known of the
"message." How many pro-gay individuals are now deeply troubled
that they ever sent their boys to the Scouts, or gave the Scouts their
money or their time as volunteers?
-Kenji Yoshino'
INTRODUCTION
In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,2 the United States
Supreme Court reinforced the principle that no matter how
large or apparently public an organization might be, the
decision to join it is imbued with meaning; a person signals
something by associating with an organization. Thus, the Boy
Scouts of America (BSA) and its members had the right of
"expressive association," which would be violated if they were
forced to extend membership to anyone who failed to meet their
admission standards. The trouble, of course, was that one of
those standards came into direct conflict with New Jersey's
public accommodations statute. This statute prohibited
institutions and organizations of a sufficiently public nature
from discriminating on the basis of enumerated
characteristics-including sexual orientation. James Dale, an
openly gay man, sought to retain his position as scoutmaster
and argued that the public accommodations statute required
f Professor of Law and Director, Center on Dispute Resolution,
Quinnipiac University School of Law; Visiting Lecturer and Senior Research
Scholar, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Akhil Amar, Ian Ayres, Kenji
Yoshino, and Bill Eskridge for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks
to Gowri Ramachandran for helpful research assistance.
1. Kenji Yoshino, Scout Loophole, FindLaw's Writ, at http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/commentary/20000630-yoshino.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2002).
2. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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this result. In ruling for the BSA, the Court effectively held
that the right of expressive association trumps the right to be
free of discrimination.
The effects of Dale extend far beyond James Dale and the
administrative offices of the BSA. The ruling affected millions
of people who were, or are now, involved in scouting. Some of
these people, no doubt, breathed a sigh of relief. Others felt a
keen disappointment-and even embarrassment-that the
organization to which they had devoted much of their time and
energy had committed itself so thoroughly to an exclusionary
policy with which they disagreed.
Dale has been framed as a battle between an organization's
interest in exercising its First Amendment right of expressive
association on the one hand, and a state's interests in
eradicating discrimination on the other.3 A third interest
deserves greater attention, however: the interest of individuals
in knowing what they express by associating with a particular
organization. The exercise of the right of expressive association
holds meaning only when the decision-to join or not to join-is
informed and deliberate. Only then can a person actually
signal something by joining. If an organization's failure to
disclose discriminatory policies allows it to recruit people who
would refuse membership if fully informed, a kind of
associational fraud occurs. In addition to potential members
and donors, the state maintains an interest in preventing this
sort of fraud.
What is astonishing in Dale is how easily a private
organization can establish that its members understand it to be
a discriminatory organization. At stake are the rights of people
who disagree with discriminatory behavior: the right to detect
their disagreement with an organization's policies and the right
to act upon it. The decision not to associate with an
organization is also expressive, and that right of expression, it
would seem, deserves protection.When the decision not to associate is collective and
coordinated, it becomes a boycott. Through boycott, people can
critique and discipline organizations. 4 Boycotts are difficult to
3. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First
Amendment, 66 Mo. L. REV. 83, 90 (2001) ("The Court [in Dale] affirmed what
should be obvious under our constitutional system: that free speech and
associated rights protected by the First Amendment trump statutory
antidiscrimination provisions.").
4. When Exxon rescinded Mobil's gay-friendly employee policies after the
[Vol 87:481
INFORMED ASSOCIATION STATUTE
pull off, however, because individual decision makers must
coordinate their activities. This Essay proposes a legislative
initiative that would make it easier for people to avoid
organizations that adopt policies with which they disagree.
Moreover, because the proposed statute would increase the
amount of information about an organization available to
potential members, it would facilitate more meaningful
decisions to join organizations when people agree with their
policies.
The thesis of this Essay is that gay rights advocates should
lobby states to enact disclosure requirements-"Informed
Association" statutes-that would help to coordinate individual
decision makers. Public accommodations statutes, like the one
in Dale, would remain in place to create a default rule of
nondiscrimination. To preserve organizations' rights to opt out
of that default rule, however, the Informed Association Statute
would create a safe harbor-a disclosure process5 that would
effectively exempt organizations from the public
accommodations statute.
Ultimately, the First Amendment rights of the
organization, as recognized by the Court in Dale, would
prevail.6 The rights of the organization would be protected at a
lower cost to the state's interest in promoting
nondiscrimination and individuals' interests in knowing where
their money and energy will be directed. Failure to comply
with the safe-harbor provisions would signal an organization's
submission to the state's public accommodations statute, and
individuals could join the group assured that they would not be
associating with a discriminatory organization.
A statute requiring disclosure of, and explicit consent to,
an association's discriminatory policies would in no way force
two companies merged, for example, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a
gay rights advocacy organization, began working to persuade ExxonMobil that
it should reinstate the employment policies deemed more fair to gay, lesbian,
and bisexual employees. Press Release, Coalition to Promote Equality at
ExxonMobil, Human Rights Campaign, HRC Calls for a Nationwide Boycott of
ExxonMobil (June 13, 2001), http://www.hrc.org/equalityatexxon/news
releases/2001/0106l3newsrelease.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2002). A nationwide
boycott is one of the persuasive strategies HRC is using. See id.
5. A range of safe-harbor processes is possible, and this Essay will
discuss several alternatives. See discussion infra Part III.
6. In this way, the statute could be seen as promoting the ascendancy of
First Amendment values. See generally Bernstein, supra note 3, at 85-126
(examining the tension between antidiscrimination norms and First
Amendment rights).
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inclusion of gay and lesbian people upon unwilling
organizations. Such a statute would, however, force some
heterosexual people to come to terms with their own acts of
discrimination. Heterosexuals would lose the plausible
deniability that currently allows them, in some cases, to enjoy
the benefits of organizations they would feel compelled to quit
if discriminatory policies were revealed. If information about
organizations' policies were readily available, ignorance would
be no excuse. The Informed Association Statute, therefore,
would force decisions that people can currently avoid by
claiming ignorance.
The Informed Association Statute thus seeks to change the
social meaning of joining an organization through a process
Professor Lawrence Lessig has called "tying."7 Through the
process of tying, a policy maker "attempts to transform the
social meaning of one act by tying it to, or associating it with,
another social meaning."8  By promoting disclosure of
discriminatory membership policies, the Informed Association
Statute would more closely tie the decision to join such an
organization to discriminatory activity. "Tying," Lessig writes,
"changes the cost [of an activity] by making it more clear just
what meaning an action has."9
For some people, the statute would thus create an
uncomfortable space-but one from which support for gay
rights could ultimately emerge. Social change often depends
upon people in power being put to hard choices. Although
President John F. Kennedy, for example, may have preferred to
sidestep the civil rights battles of his day, the moral force of
activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. forced Kennedy's
hand.'0  Forty years later, history credits Kennedy with
7. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943, 1009 (1995).
8. Id.
9. Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2181, 2188 (1996). Tying is the flip side or "nested opposition" of
ambiguation, because it clarifies or highlights a particular character of some
activity, while ambiguation blurs categories. See Lessig, supra note 7, at 1010
n.224.
10. See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 233-36
(Clayborne Carson ed., 1998). Dr. King explains the nature of Kennedy's
change:
President Kennedy was a strongly contrasted personality. There
were in fact two John Kennedys. One presided in the first two years
under pressure of the uncertainty caused by his razor-thin margin of
victory. He vacillated, trying to sense the direction his leadership
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providing much of the momentum that propelled the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 through Congress. The people in power this
Essay addresses are not only legislators and political leaders,
but perhaps more importantly, they are the great center of the
heterosexual majority. Their choices-even ones that are
difficult or uncomfortable at first-could make all the
difference for the cause of gay rights in this country.
Part I of this Essay summarizes the Dale case, with a focus
on the Court's desire to protect the right of expressive
association. Part II relates the popular reaction to Dale,
especially institutional efforts by churches, schools, and cities
to disassociate themselves from the BSA. As a complement to
this institutional work, Part III proposes the Informed
Association Statute as a means to facilitate
individuals' deliberate associations-or disassociations-when
organizations discriminate. The Essay concludes by examining
some of the risks and benefits of the legislative strategy
proposed.
I. DALE v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
In the now familiar case giving rise to this proposal, the
BSA terminated James Dale as a Boy Scout leader because he
was gay, and Mr. Dale challenged his expulsion. When the
case reached the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist told the story in this way:
The Boy Scouts is a private, not-for-profit organization engaged in
instilling its system of values in young people. The Boy Scouts asserts
that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to
instill. Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose adult
membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts
learned that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey's public
accommodations law requires that the Boy Scouts readmit Dale. This
case presents the question whether applying New Jersey's public
accommodations law in this way violates the Boy Scouts' First
could travel while retaining and building support for his
administration. However, in 1963, a new Kennedy had emerged. He
had found that public opinion was not in a rigid mold. American
political thought was not committed to conservatism, nor radicalism,
nor moderation. It was above all fluid. As such it contained trends
rather than hard lines, and affirmative leadership could guide it into
constructive channels.
Id. at 235-36.
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Amendment right of expressive association. We hold that it does."I
Justice Rehnquist's summary tells a simple story, one in
which the conclusion (to require the BSA to readmit Mr. Dale
would violate the BSA's right of expressive association) seems
to flow almost inexorably from the very identity of the
characters: an organization "engaged in instilling its system of
values in young people" on the one hand, and an "avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist" on the other.
Mr. Dale sued the BSA in New Jersey Superior Court,
alleging that the organization violated New Jersey's common
law and public accommodations statute 2 by excluding him
from membership based solely on his sexual orientation. 3 The
case wended its way to the New Jersey Supreme Court via
decisions for the BSA in the trial court and for Mr. Dale on
appeal. 14 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the BSA
constituted a place of public accommodation due to its size and
public nature, 15 and was subject to the public accommodations
statute. 6 According to the court, by excluding Mr. Dale based
on his sexual orientation the BSA violated the statute.17
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the BSA's claim
that subjecting it to the public accommodations law would
violate its federal constitutional right 'to associate for the
purpose of engaging in protected speech."' 8  The court
acknowledged that the BSA "expresses a belief in moral values
and uses its activities to encourage the moral development of
its members."'19 The court could not, however, accept the notion
11. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
12. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation).
13. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92, slip op. at 6 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with author), af/d in part, rev'd in
part, 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J.
1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). For an analysis of the trial court's opinion,
see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias
Canons as a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REv. 363, 385-
87, 398-400 (2000).
14. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645-47.
15. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1210-13.
16. Id. at 1213-18 (reaching this conclusion after rejecting BSA's
argument that it fell within one of the statute's exceptions).
17. Id. at 1218-19.
18. Id. at 1219 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537, 544 (1987)).
19. Id. at 1223.
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that "a 'shared goal[]' of Boy Scout members is to associate in
order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral."20
Because the court believed that Dale's membership "would not
'affect in any significant way [the BSA's] existing members'
ability to carry out their various purposes,"' it ruled that being
forced to include Dale would not violate the BSA's right of
expressive association.2'
The United States Supreme Court reversed. A deferential
review of the Scout Oath and Law persuaded the majority that
homosexuality is contrary to the values the BSA seeks to instill
in its members. The BSA asserted that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the Scout Oath and Law, particularly the
Scout Oath to remain "morally straight" and the Scout Law
requiring scouts to be "clean."22 The Court acknowledged that
the Oath and Law do not mention homosexuality expressly,
and that the terms "morally straight" and "clean" are "by no
means self-defining."23 Notwithstanding the ambiguity of these
phrases, the Court deferred to the organization's interpretation
of its own doctrine and accepted the BSA's assertion that it
views homosexuality as immoral.24 More importantly for this
analysis, the Court accepted the BSA's assertion that the BSA
had clearly and consistently expressed this view of
20. Id. at 1223-24 (alteration in original) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). Conversely, the United States Supreme Court
stated that such a central purpose is not required in order to gain First
Amendment protection. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 ("[Associations do not have
to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment."). A five-year-old boy I
know expressed skepticism similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court's,
however, when he overheard some adults discussing the Dale case on the day
the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion. He exclaimed in shock
and indignation, "The purpose of the Boy Scouts is to exclude?"
21. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1225 (alteration in original) (quoting Rotary Club,
481 U.S. at 548).
22. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
23. Id. Indeed, as Kenji Yoshino has noted, "[T]he Scout Handbook
defines 'morally straight' to include the following prescriptions: '[Gluide your
life with honesty, purity, and justice,' 'Respect and defend the rights of all
people,' 'Your relationships with others should be honest and open."' Yoshino,
supra note 1 (second alteration in original).
24. Dale, 530 U.S. at 651. The Court stated,
The Boy Scouts asserts that it "teach[es] that homosexual conduct is
not morally straight," and that it does "not want to promote
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." We accept the
Boy Scouts' assertion. We need not inquire further to determine the
nature of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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homosexuality in the past (though the Court considered this
past behavior relevant only to show "the sincerity of the
professed beliefs," not to secure First Amendment protection).2 5
According to the majority opinion in Dale, if forced to admit
Mr. Dale, the BSA's expressive activity concerning
homosexuality would be impaired. This impairment would
occur, moreover, even if it were true, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court had concluded, 26 that the BSA "discourages its
leaders from disseminating any views on sexual issues."27 As
Justice Rehnquist explained, "The fact that the organization
does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it
tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views
receive no First Amendment protection."28
II. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO DALE
The BSA relies heavily on community sponsorship and
financial support. Churches and schools often provide the Boy
Scouts free meeting space, and local United Way groups
provide financial assistance.29  In the wake of Dale, a
nationwide movement has developed to remove various forms
of community support for the BSA.30  This movement
principally targets the two institutional supports identified
above-meeting space and money. Moreover, three features of
this movement are interesting and important: it has involved
people who are gay and non-gay, it has not been orchestrated in
25. Id.
26. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223 ("Boy Scout members do not associate for the
purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is immoral; Boy Scouts
discourages its leaders from disseminating any views on sexual issues .. .
27. Id., quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 654. The Court further noted,
[E]ven if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders from
disseminating views on sexual issues-a fact that the Boy Scouts
disputes with contrary evidence-the First Amendment protects the
Boy Scouts' method of expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout
leaders to avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example, this
fact does not negate the sincerity of its belief discussed above.
Dale, 540 U.S. at 655.
28. Dale, 540 U.S. at 656.
29. United Way of America, United Way Funding of Boy Scouts, at
http://national.unitedway.orgaboutuw/boyscouts.cfm (last visited Oct. 20,
2002).
30. Actually, this movement can be traced to earlier challenges to the
BSA's discriminatory policy. Eight local United Way chapters adopted anti-
discrimination policies affecting their relationship with the BSA prior to the
Dale decision. Id.
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any central way, and it has involved people in a variety of roles
(e.g., BSA members, parents of members, and people who are
not involved directly with the BSA).
As a result of this diverse effort, many communities and
organizations have withdrawn sponsorship of the BSA. The
first institutional response has been the withdrawal of free
meeting space for the BSA. Examples of both private and
public withdrawals of support exist. In Taunton,
Massachusetts, for instance, the Union Congregational Church
ended a two-year relationship with the BSA.3' The church had
subsidized the Scouts and provided them with meeting space. 32
Pastor Beverly Duncan explained that gay and heterosexual
members of the church expressed concern about the ruling in
Dale.33 Although the church had experienced no problems with
the local scout troop, it could not ignore the "stark contrast"
between the national organization's stance on homosexuality
and the church's beliefs. 34 Further, one Oak Park, Illinois
church turned the tables on the BSA to force the organization's
hand: Cornerstone Church's application for a charter to sponsor
a Cub Scout pack was denied by the BSA because the church
stated an intention to run an "open and inclusive program."35
School districts, too, have sought to restrict BSA access to
meeting space. Nine months after the Supreme Court ruling in
Dale, directors of the New York City Board of Education passed
a resolution urging school boards to deny building access to any
group that engages in discrimination. 36 In its October 2000
newsletter, Vice President Harris Dinkoff wrote, "We cannot
tell ourselves and our children that it is OK to exclude and be
biased against one group of people and then say we are not
biased against anyone else. By accepting bias in any form, we
31. Dave Wedge, Taunton Church Drops Scout Program over Ban on
Gays, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 24, 2000, at 12, 2000 WL 4341549.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. ("We have a big, red and white banner out front that says, 'All Are
Welcome'.... Jesus never said anything about homosexuality. We're taking
this stance because of how we believe in Christianity.").
35. Lisa Black, Oak Park Church Is Denied Scout Bid, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8,
2001, § 2, at 4.
36. Press Release, Board of Education of the City of New York, Schools
Chancellor and Board President Announce Decision to Prohibit Boy Scouts
from Bidding on Future Contracts Unless Scouts' Discriminatory Policies
Change (Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Board of Education] (on file with author).
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condone what we profess to condemn." 37
On December 1, 2000, Chancellor Harold 0. Levy
announced that New York City schools could no longer sponsor
Boy Scout troops.38 The BSA could no longer use public schools
as sites for recruiting new members, and the organization was
barred from bidding on school contracts. Troops could continue
to hold meetings in public schools, but only on the same basis
as all other organizations that have access to public schools as
meeting places. 39
In Florida, the Broward County School Board took more
extreme measures. It voted unanimously on November 14,
2000, to ban the BSA entirely from its schools pursuant to the
board's nondiscrimination policy,40 which forbids use of school
facilities by "any group or organization which discriminates on
the basis of [a series of characteristics including] sexual
orientation."4' Prior to the vote, individual board members
expressed their desire to send a message not only to the BSA,
but also to the community that discrimination "'would not be
tolerated.' 42 When the BSA challenged this action in federal
court, the court scrutinized different aspects of the board's
decision independently. 43 The court found that the school
board was "free to fashion its own message": It did not have to
affirmatively endorse, participate, or solicit scout members as
provided in the cancelled partnership agreement. 44 However,
37. Elizabeth Benjamin, Scouts Facing Criticism over Ban on Gay
Leaders, TIMES UNION (Albany), Nov. 7, 2000, at B1, 2000 WL 23870710.
38. Board of Education, supra note 36.
39. Id.; see also Rose Arce, New York Schools Cut Ties with Boy Scouts:
Education Board Objects to Anti-Gay Policy, CNN.com, Dec. 1, 2000, at
http://www.cnn.com/20OO/US/12/01/ny.schools.boyscouts/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2002).
40. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302-03 (S.D. Fla.
2001). The BSA partnership agreement also contained a provision prohibiting
discrimination, which the school board brought to BSA's attention before it
voted to bar the Scouts from school facilities. Id. at 1300-01.
41. School Board of Broward County (Fla.), Use of Broward County School
Facilities for Non-School Purposes (Apr. 29, 1970), available at http://www.
broward.k12.fl.us/sbbcpolicies/docs/Pl341.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2002)
(emphasis added).
42. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (quoting Ortega Aft. Ex. 25 at 13-15 (M.
Oliphant)).
43. Id. at 1306-11 (analyzing the merits of BSA's claim before granting
BSA's motion for preliminary injunction).
44. Id. at 1308 (discussing the partnership agreement between the Boy
Scouts and the school board that gave the BSA use of school resources to assist
in Boy Scout recruitment); see also id. at 1299-1301 (describing the agreement
[Vol 87:481
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the school board's attempt to prevent the BSA from using
school facilities-limited public fora-on the same basis as
other private groups would violate the First Amendment. 45
Although the school board could speak for itself and express its
"disapproval of intolerance toward homosexuality," it was not
free to punish the BSA for its contrary message.46
The United States Congress has stepped into this fray as
well. In June of 2001, the Senate approved a bill introduced by
Senator Jesse Helms (Helms Amendment), which would
withhold federal funds from public school districts that deny
"'equal access' to meeting space for the Boy Scouts and 'any
other' youth groups that 'prohibit the acceptance of
homosexuality.' '4 7 The House of Representatives passed a
similar amendment in May of 2001.48 Congressional opponents
of these measures argued that the Helms Amendment
amounted to little more than gratuitous anti-gay rhetoric,
because the United States Constitution and existing civil rights
laws already prevent schools from denying the Boy Scouts
access to meeting space on the same basis as other groups.49
Gay civil rights groups and their allies in Congress worked
with a House-Senate conference committee to remove language
they deemed most harmful. 50 The enacted legislation, the Boy
Scouts of America Equal Access Act, makes clear that nothing
in the statute "shall be construed to require any school, agency,
or a school served by an agency to sponsor any group officially
affiliated with the Boy Scouts of America."5' The final version
thus appears to extend no further than preexisting case law; it
requires schools to permit the BSA to use facilities on the same
terms provided to other outside organizations. 52  Schools
and the school board's assistance in scout member solicitation, which included
an annual School Night for Scouting).
45. Id. at 1310-11.
46. Id. at 1308.
47. See Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Helms Measure Passes, WASH. BLADE, June 15,
2001, http://www.washblade.com/national/010615b.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2002).
48. Id.
49. See Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-11.
50. Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, House-Senate Compromise
on Anti-Gay Helms Amendment Mitigates Most Harmful Aspects (Nov. 6,
2001), at http://www.hrc.org/newsreleases/2001/011106troops.asp (last visited
Sept. 24, 2002).
51. Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §
9525(b)(2), 115 Stat. 1425, 1981 (2002) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7905).
52. Chibbaro, supra note 47.
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remain free to cancel sponsorships.
The second institutional reaction to Dale has been an effort
to remove the BSA from lists of local United Way funding
recipients. In Broward County, for example, the United Way
announced that beginning in 2002, the BSA would be ineligible
for program grants due to the organization's discriminatory
policy. 53 This sort of funding boycott can be powerful because
people opposed to Boy Scout policies can express their
disapproval and impose costs on the organization, even if they
are not potential members or parents of potential members.
Inertia, however, is apparently difficult to overcome. According
to the United Way of America, the national organization
permits local groups to set their own funding policies, but only
thirty-five to forty-five local groups-out of 1400 total-have
changed their policies regarding scout funding.54
The political stakes of limiting BSA funding can sometimes
be high. In Tempe, Arizona, Mayor Neil Giuliano attempted to
disqualify the BSA from city employee donations to the United
Way. This action triggered a recall effort against him.5 5 After
he received substantial criticism, Giuliano said that city
employees should determine their own contributions to be
53. Joyce Howard Price, Florida School Board Boots Scouts over Gays,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 4170006.
54. Peter Freiberg, Rallies Target Boy Scouts Policy Banning Gays, WASH.
BLADE, Aug. 24, 2001, http://www.washblade.com/national/010824g.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2002). Perhaps the Kauai chapter of the United Way is
typical. In response to concerns about continued funding of the BSA, this
chapter issued the following statement:
Kauai United Way values the dignity and worth of all people and
works on behalf of the broadest possible constituency, including
people from a range of backgrounds and points of view. Kauai United
Way implements its philosophy of non-discrimination by maintaining
a network of charities that embrace special considerations and
community needs. Each individual participating agency has
developed their own mission statement. Kauai United Way will
continue to consider the Kauai District Boy Scouts as a participating
agency.
E-mail from Scott Giarman, Executive Director, Kauai United Way, to William
E. Woods, Executive Director, Gay and Lesbian Education Advocacy
Foundation (Mar. 8, 2002, 1:31:03 HST) (on file with author).
55. It is possible that the recall was also sparked by the fact that Giuliano
is openly gay. See Kim Krisberg, Giuliano Wins: Mayoral Recall Effort Fails,
WASH. BLADE, Sept. 14, 2001, http://www.washblade.comnational/010914g.ht
m (last visited Sept. 16, 2002). Interestingly, the recall election went forward
on September 11, 2001 even after news of the terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington.
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made to the United Way.56 Although Giuliano abandoned his
effort, the controversy seems to have suppressed donations to
the United Way by city employees. 57
Corporate donors to the BSA have mirrored actions by local
United Way chapters and their donors. For instance, Novell,
Inc., a computer software firm headquartered in Provo, Utah,
announced that it would no longer match employee
contributions to the BSA.58 The company announced this new
rule as an effort to comply with its overarching policy not to
make charitable contributions to discriminatory
organizations. 59 Novell later modified its stance, agreeing to
match employee contributions to the local United Way
chapter.60 In addition, in December of 2000, the Wells Fargo
Bank instructed the United Way nots-o allocate any of its
$400,000 annual corporate gift to the BSA.61
Some regional councils and local chapters of the BSA are
defecting from the national position on homosexuality,
attempting to substitute their own policies of inclusion and
nondiscrimination. 62 In Rhode Island, where the statewide
public accommodations law covers discrimination on the basis
56. Associated Press, Three Communities to Vote on Mayors, ARIZONA
DAILY WILDCAT, Sept. 11, 2001, http://wildcat.arizona.edupapers/95/16/05.
html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
57. Tempe workers donated $42,794 in the Fall of 2000, less than half of
the $89,400 they contributed in the Fall of 1999. Scouts Hurt United Way,
FREETHOUGHT TODAY, Dec. 2000, http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/december2000/
statechurch.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
58. Bob Mims, Novell Halts Boy Scout Contributions, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 3787210.
59. Id.
60. Novell, Inc., Novell Employee Giving, at http://www.novell.com/compa
ny/cr/employee-giving.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2002) (displaying Novell's
employee-giving policy). Although employees are free to prevent the BSA from
receiving their United Way contribution, the United Way in most places has
continued to fund local Boy Scout troops. The United Way of the Great Salt
Lake Area, for example, donated $188,000 to the Boy Scouts in 1999. See
Mims, supra note 58.
61. David Austin, Wells Fargo and PGE Divert Funds from Scouts,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 11, 2000, at B1, 2000 WL 27112429. The BSA's "Learning
for Life" program in city schools will continue to get Wells Fargo funding,
however, because it does not exclude gay students from participation. Id.
(correction that ran Dec. 12, 2000).
62. Short of such defiance, other heads of area scout councils have asked
the BSA to revoke its ban on gay scout leaders. See Laura Parker, Big Cities'
Scout Leaders Pushing for Inclusion of Gays, USA TODAY, June 15, 2001, at
Al.
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of sexual orientation, 63 a Cub Scout pack and a Boy Scout troop
in Providence informed the BSA that they would ignore the
national policy.64  Daniel Gasparo, chief executive of the
Greater New York Councils of the BSA, asserted that the New
York scout organizations do not discriminate based on sexual
orientation. 65  Such statements of inclusion and
nondiscrimination may be subject to monitoring and discipline
by the national body of the BSA, however. This is a result the
Providence pack and troop are prepared to handle; they
indicate that they will refuse to enforce the anti-gay policy even
if the national organization responds by terminating their
charters.66
Individuals could take action here too. If all eagle scouts
who support gay rights were to sign a national petition, or
begin publicly to renounce their honors from the BSA, the
organization would receive disapproval from some of its most
valued members, undermining in a retroactive way the
organization's claims about the importance of the anti-gay
policy to the scouting experience. 67 Indeed, even without active
coordination, individual decision makers seem to be steering
clear of the Boy Scouts. According to Newsweek magazine,
internal BSA documents show that Cub and Boy Scout
membership dropped 4.5% in 2000-7.8% in the northeast
region of the United States-while membership rates in the
same period increased for other youth organizations that do not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 68
The BSA's response to all of this agitation, apparently, has
been to dig in its heels and resist the inclusion of gay men even
more vehemently. On February 6, 2002, the BSA issued a
63. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2000).
64. Jennifer Levitz, Second Group of Scouts Vows to Defy Ban on Gays,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 25, 2000, at A3, 2000 WL 28390933; Jennifer Levitz, Six
Scout Leaders Reject Ban on Gays, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 7, 2000, at Al, 2000
WL 28388177.
65. Anemona Hartocollis, Levy Limits Scout Events in the Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at B1.
66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. Young men who achieve the rank of Eagle Scout are eligible to join the
elite National Eagle Scout Association as men. See Boy Scouts of America,
National Eagle Scout Association, at http://www.scouting.org/nesa/ index.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
68. See David France, Scouts Divided, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 2001, at 44, 47
(noting that Girl Scouts and Boys and Girls Clubs are experiencing increases
in membership rates).
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press release 69 and accompanying resolution announcing that
"the national officers... agree that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the traditional values espoused in the Scout
Oath and Law and that an avowed homosexual cannot serve as
a role model for the values of the Oath and Law. '70 This
finding is cited in support of another of the BSA's resolutions:
"WHEREAS, the -national officers reaffirm that, as a national
organization whose very reason for existence is to instill and
reinforce values in youth, the BSA's values cannot be subject to
local option choices, but must be the same in every unit. ''71
This resolution sends a strong signal to the local chapters in
New York and Rhode Island: Inclusive policies will not be
tolerated.
III. LESSONS FROM DALE-A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Because James Dale publicly and persistently challenged
his exclusion from the BSA, America knows that the
organization discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
Indeed, some organizations have cited the BSA's newfound
notoriety as the factor forcing them to pull their support. As
one Broward County school board member explained,
The Scouts wanted to make a statement and that they did by pushing
this point to the Supreme Court. By so doing, they put us on notice of
something that we were unaware of previously. Had it not gone to
court, had it not gotten the publicity that it did, we may never have
known about it and may not be having this discussion... If we have
no knowledge ... we can't take action.
72
The BSA's policy has thus become a matter of public record.
But what of those organizations whose exclusionary policies
remain more obscure?
The United States Supreme Court in Dale set a rather
relaxed standard for the timing and articulation of an
organization's "message" sufficiently important to displace the
state's public accommodations statute. This raises the
69. Press Release, Boy Scouts of America, BSA Affirms Traditional
Leadership Standards (Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.scouting.org/media/press/
020206/index.html.
70. Boy Scouts of America Resolution (Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.scouting.
org/media/press/020206/resolution.html. The resolution also makes clear that
"duty to God is not a mere ideal for those choosing to associate with the Boy
Scouts of America; it is an obligation." Id.
71. Id.
72. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Ortega Aft. Ex. 25 at 20 (P. Eichner)).
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troubling possibility, as Professor Kenji Yoshino argues, that
an organization can simply opt out of a public accommodations
statute anytime it wants, receiving First Amendment
protection by manufacturing a "message" of discrimination
even as late as the litigation in which an act of discrimination
is challenged. 73 Moreover, because the Court has instructed
lower courts to adopt a deferential approach-taking
organizations at their word regarding their own discriminatory
aims, goals, or philosophies-the eleventh-hour invocation of
discriminatory "messages" may be particularly troubling.
Another reading of Dale is possible, however. The actual
holding of the case, after all, focuses on a particular mechanism
employed by the state to further its interests in
nondiscrimination: a requirement of mandatory admission.
The Courf's holding acknowledges the state's interests but does
not find that those interests can justify this particular
mechanism:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy
Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
burden the organization's right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association. That being the
case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law.
74
The Court does not preclude the state from trying other
ways to further nondiscrimination. Perhaps the New Jersey
public accommodations statute failed as applied to the Boy
Scouts because the enforcing mechanism-mandatory
admission-provided no opportunity for the organization to opt
out of what would otherwise be understood as the
nondiscrimination default.
Would a statute creating such a default but prescribing an
opt-out or safe-harbor procedure withstand constitutional
attack? Clearly, the opt-out procedure would have to avoid
"materially interfer[ing] with the ideas that ... organization[s
seek] to express."75 Permitting "expressive" organizations to
73. Yoshino, supra note 1.
74. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
75. Id. at 657. The Court stated,
We recognized in cases such as Roberts and Duarte that States have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in
public accommodations. But in each of these cases we went on to
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opt out of the public accommodations statute, but requiring
them to do so publicly, would achieve three goals: promote the
state's interests in nondiscrimination, uphold the
organizations' right of expressive association, and protect the
public from unknowing association with discriminatory
organizations.
The question is whether requiring an organization to
register as a potential discriminator would interfere with the
organization's expression of those discriminatory ideas. On the
one hand, by requiring an organization to register as one
reserving the right to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, the safe-harbor process could be seen to facilitate
rather than suppress "the organization's right to oppose or
disfavor homosexual conduct."76 An organization could hardly
complain that its ability to express disapproval of
homosexuality would be "burdened" if it were forced to make
public its expression of disapproval. It would be a broad
reading of Dale indeed to say that an organization has a First
Amendment right to exclude gay and lesbian members in order
to express disapproval of homosexuality and a simultaneous
right to keep that disapproval secret from its own members and
potential members. 77 On the other hand, if the statutory
language pertaining to registration were too blunt (too general,
or in some cases, perhaps, too specific), it might be seen as
forcing an organization's views into a prefabricated expression
of discrimination, one that is actually inconsistent with the
views of the organization and its members.
conclude that the enforcement of these statutes would not materially
interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to express.
Id.
76. Id. at 659. Perhaps the organization would object to the mode or
manner in which the statute forces it to express this idea, arguing that the
way in which an idea is expressed is absolutely constitutive of the idea itself.
To the extent that the safe-harbor process imposed a template of flat,
unqualified discrimination on policies or practices that organizations might
experience and express in more nuanced terms, the equation of style and
substance could gain greater weight.
77. Yet it is just this potential reading of Dale that troubles Yoshino. See
Yoshino, supra note 1. He worries that the Court's approach, "failing to look
at both the organization's claims and the contemporaneous evidence," will be
"particularly dangerous, for it lets organizations that want to discriminate
have it both ways." Id. If contemporaneous evidence fails to reveal the
importance of the discriminatory policy to the organization, Yoshino suggests,
members could be confused about the nature of the organization they have
joined. Id. I agree. The statute proposed in this Essay is a possible solution
to this problem.
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The solution to this problem is a safe-harbor clause that
merely refers to actions or potential actions rather than
examining the organization's policies or philosophies. Still, to
prevent the opt-out process from eviscerating the public
accommodations statute, the state should require at least a
facial claim by the organization that its exclusionary practices
are necessary to protect legitimate rights of expressive
association.
To balance these concerns, a modified public
accommodations statute, the Informed Association Statute,
might read as follows:
(1) All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional
or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to conditions and
limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized
as and declared to be a civil right. 8
(2) When necessary to preserve a right of expressive association in an
organization subject to this Act, the organization may discriminate in
admission to membership on the basis of a characteristic enumerated in
section 1 of this Act. In order to qualify for this exception, the
organization must file with the Secretary of State a statement signed by
the organization's officers that:
(a) affirms that the organization reserves the right to discriminate in
admission to or terms of membership;
(b) lists the characteristic(s) enumerated in section 1 of this Act on which
the discrimination would be based; and
(c) sets forth the message or policy of the organization that necessitates
this discrimination.
(3) Any organization failing to comply with the requirements set forth in
subsection 2 is subject to the full force and effect of this Act.
Nothing in the safe-harbor process would require that all
members agree with the discriminatory policy,79 only that they
become or remain members with knowledge of the policy.80
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2002). A definitions section in
the statute could list in detail the sorts of facilities and organizations covered
by the act. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2002) (containing
this type of list).
79. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 ("[T]he First Amendment simply does not
require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order for the
group's policy to be 'expressive association."').
80. In this way, the discriminatory policy is analogous to a latent or
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Other approaches are possible. The statute could require
that, as an alternative to the mode of disclosure set forth in
subsection 2 above, the organization could disclose clearly and
in writing to all members, donors, and potential members and
donors that the organization reserves the right to discriminate
in admission to or terms of membership, listing the
characteristic(s) enumerated in section 1 of the Act on which
the discrimination would be based. In order to prove that all
members and donors had received such disclosure, 81 the
organization would need to maintain on file a signed statement
from each affirming the following matters:
(1) The member or donor was informed that the organization reserves the
right to discriminate in admission to or terms of membership;
(2) The organization disclosed which of the characteristic(s) enumerated in
section 1 of the Act would be the basis for such discrimination; and
(3) With this information, the member consented to membership in the
organization or the donor made a contribution.
This kind of documentation would protect individuals'
interests in joining organizations with full information about
the message their association will convey. It would also relieve
the organization from publicly declaring that it might, at some
point in the future, discriminate on some basis otherwise
outlawed by the public accommodations statute. Because this
approach to the safe-harbor exemption would give
hidden defect in a commercial product: a seller must disclose the danger in
order to avoid liability. 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2:8 (3d ed. 2000). "The maker's obligation to warn of
hidden dangers in its products is an ancient one. Its roots reach back into
early Roman sales law, early English civil law, and the ecclesiastical (but not
the secular) law of medieval England." Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. A plaintiff later seeking the protection of a public accommodations
statute would undoubtedly lose the case if the defendant could produce a
statement, signed by that person at the time she joined, acknowledging
disclosure of the organization's discriminatory policy. In Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, Judge McGann in the trial court consumed approximately thirty
pages of his opinion reviewing the history and policies of the BSA to determine
whether Dale knew that the BSA excluded gay men. No. MON-C-330-92, slip
op. at 8-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with author), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 734
A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The court's extensive review
of documents covered everything from the BSA corporate charter to a 1972
Scoutmaster Handbook. Id. at 11-12, 36-38. Ultimately, the court relied
heavily upon the 1972 handbook, which Dale presumably read when he
became a leader. Id. at 38.
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organizations greater control over the expression of their
messages, they might prefer it to the approach that requires a
public filing with the state.
Under this alternative approach employing written consent
forms, however, actually invoking the exemption in the context
of litigation could prove far more onerous for an organization-
perhaps fatally so. If an organization were ever sued under the
public accommodations statute, invoking the safe-harbor
exemption under this permutation could require the
organization to give the court access to the disclosure forms
signed by individual members. This could impermissibly
infringe on the organization's right to keep its membership lists
secret.
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Alabama sought to
obtain membership lists from the state chapter of the
NAACP.8 2 The NAACP resisted, arguing that disclosure of its
membership list would subject individual members to
"economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."8 3 These
effects of disclosure would, in turn, deter people from
associating with the NAACP in derogation of their rights to
free association and expression. The United States Supreme
Court held that "immunity from state scrutiny of membership
lists [was] so related to the right of the members to pursue
their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely
with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '8 4
The statute sought to be enforced in Patterson bore no
relationship to rights of association on its face. It simply
required a foreign corporation to take certain procedural steps
before doing business in the state.85 The NAACP did not
comply with the statute because it considered itself exempt. 86
The Attorney General of Alabama sued in equity to enjoin the
NAACP from further activities within Alabama, and indeed
sought to oust the organization from the state. 87 The state
82. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958).
83. Id. at 462.
84. Id. at 466.
85. The corporation was required to file its corporate charter with the
secretary of state, designate a place of business, and name an agent to receive
service of process. Id. at 451.
86. Id. at 452.
87. Id. The bill in equity alleged,
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moved for production of NAACP documents, including "records
containing the names and addresses of all Alabama 'members'
and 'agents' of the Association."88 The Court summarized the
NAACP's objection to producing membership lists:
[T]he effect of compelled disclosure of the membership lists will be to
abridge the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful
association in support of their common beliefs. It contends that
governmental action which, although not directly suppressing
association, nevertheless carries this consequence, can be justified
only upon some overriding valid interest of the State.
89
The Court agreed that it should carefully scrutinize any state
regulation restricting the right of NAACP members to associate
freely, even if the restrictive effect was indirect or
unintentional.90
Moreover, the Court recognized the importance of privacy,
particularly for minority groups. 91 The Court reasoned that
compelled disclosure of member lists could drive members or
potential members away from the organization "because of fear
of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations
and of the consequences of this exposure." 92 The fact that
punishment for unpopular views would come "not from state
action but from private community pressures" mattered not a
whit: "The crucial factor," said the Court, is "the interplay of
governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial
exertion of state power represented by the production order
that private action takes hold."93 None of Alabama's stated
interests was sufficiently important to justify this restraint on
[Tihe Association had opened a regional office and had organized
various affiliates in Alabama; had recruited members and solicited
contributions within the State; had given financial support and
furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the
state university; and had supported a Negro boycott of the bus lines
in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers without regard to
race.
Id. It is interesting and perhaps heartening to see the way time changes
perceptions. The NAACP's efforts, which after forty-five years and immense
social change are perceived by most people as heroic acts, were at the time
alleged to have caused "irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of
the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama." Id.
88. Id. at 453.
89. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 461.
91. Id. at 462 ("Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.").
92. Id. at 463.
93. Id.
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association. 94 Under Patterson, then, if the procedures for
opting out of the public accommodations statute would at any
point require the organization to make public the identity of its
members, the statute would violate the First Amendment.
A less problematic approach relying upon individual,
signed forms might still be feasible, however. The statute could
provide that any organization sued under the statute could
plead as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff in the case
had received full disclosure of the organization's discriminatory
policy. For plaintiffs who had been members of or donors to the
organization, this would in most cases involve a consent form
bearing the plaintiffs signature. If the plaintiff was not a
member or donor, the organization would have to prove
disclosure in some other way-perhaps by documenting that
the plaintiff received information about the organization's
discriminatory policy. Because the public accommodations
statute protects many characteristics, and everyone has a race,
a sex, a national origin, and so forth,95 a broad array of people
could be considered potential plaintiffs. The organization
would therefore have an incentive to make these disclosures to
every person expressing interest in the organization.
Organizations might not feel an equally strong incentive to
inform all potential members or donors. 96 The trouble with the
affirmative defense approach is that it does not ensure
disclosure to people marked by the organization as unlikely
plaintiffs.97 For example, an organization that excludes openly
gay men might feel little compulsion to disclose this policy to a
married father of four who it identifies as heterosexual and is
94. Id. at 466.
95. Majority group members are not always viewed this way. Some
commentators have argued that characteristics of dominant groups can
become invisible so that, for example, whites are not seen as having a race,
men are not seen as having a sex, and heterosexuals are not seen as having a
sexual orientation-they are simply "the norm" by which other groups are
measured. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76, 108 (2000); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But
Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
96. Donors, for example, could be artificial persons lacking the sorts of
characteristics enumerated in the statute.
97. This group would no doubt vary from one organization to another.
Although white, heterosexual men between twenty-five and forty would
appear unlikely to sue the Boy Scouts under the public accommodations
statute, they could be deemed more likely plaintiffs against a youth
organization targeted to, say, African-American girls.
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therefore unlikely to suffer exclusion. The purpose of the
statute would not be well served if the organization's incentive
to disclose a discriminatory policy decreased with respect to
individuals who would ordinarily gain admission to the
organization. The larger objective of this Essay is to argue that
heterosexual people who would themselves be admitted might
object to joining (and should, indeed, be protected from
unknowingly joining) an organization that excludes gay,
lesbian, or bisexual people.
Therefore, the better approach would be to design an opt-
out procedure based on ex ante, public disclosures of policy with
the secretary of state. This approach would not run afoul of
Patterson. Although Patterson holds inviolable the secrecy of
an organization's membership list when disclosure would
impede expression, the case does not stand for a general right
to secrecy simply because an organization is engaged in
expressive activity. Thus, the NAACP did not deny the state's
right to obtain information "concerning the purposes of the
Association and its activities within the State. 98 The Court
noted that the NAACP had apparently complied with the
production order except for the membership lists; it had
supplied "varied business records, its charter and statement of
purposes, the names of all of its directors and officers, and...
the total number of its Alabama members and the amount of
their dues."99 On the record before the Court, these items did
not appear "subject to constitutional challenge." 100
Patterson condemns state regulation that drives people
away from organizations through which they would express
views protected by the First Amendment. In Patterson,
disclosing membership lists would have made it harder for
people who agreed with the organization's mission to join or
remain with the organization. An approach to the Informed
Association Statute requiring an ex ante filing with the
secretary of state, in contrast, would require disclosure of
association policies, not individual members' identities. The
required disclosure would only make it easier for people who
disagree with the organization's mission to decline
membership. The statute would trigger the sorts of concerns
expressed in Patterson only if it were to stigmatize the
98. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463-64.
99. Id. at 465.
100. Id.
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organization or its policies to such a degree that people who
agreed with them were also driven from the organization.
Therefore, although Patterson would shield an organization
like the BSA from disclosing its members' names, 10 1 the case
does not hold that an organization's policies are immune from
publication. It would seem rather inconsistent for an
organization to argue simultaneously that it has an interest
protected by the First Amendment in expressing negative views
about homosexuality and an interest in keeping its views about
homosexuality a secret. Granted, an organization has a
legitimate interest in controlling the expression of its policies,
purposes, and missions. 102  To withstand a constitutional
challenge, therefore, any disclosure regime enacted to support a
public accommodations statute would have to avoid imposing
ideas or modes of expression on an organization that are not
the organization's own.
Control over the expression of ideas would remain with the
101. It is hard to see what possible rationale the state could offer to justify
such an approach that requires organizations to disclose a list of its members'
names to opt out of the public accommodations statute. Non-members might
claim an interest in knowing who belongs to discriminatory organizations, the
better to avoid or shame people whose behavior cuts against norms of
nondiscrimination. Indeed, the state might put so much weight on
nondiscrimination norms that it would wish to burden people who even
consider joining a discriminatory organization. A state might argue that it
can put potential members in a more uncomfortable position if they purport
generally to favor gay rights, for example, but the disclosure statute forces
them explicitly to acknowledge that they are knowingly joining a group that
discriminates against gay people. Using public disclosure to facilitate private
sanctions, however, is precisely what Patterson condemned. In some cases, of
course, people waive rights to privacy. For example, judges are not permitted
to belong to any organization that discriminates in membership on the basis of
personal characteristics enumerated in the applicable judicial code of conduct.
See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2(C) (West 1986) (barring
judges from holding "membership in any organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or sexual
orientation"). After the Supreme Court ruled in Dale, a judge on the
California Court of Appeals resigned from his post as an assistant
scoutmaster. Carol Ness, Judge Quits As Scoutmaster over Gay Policy, S.F.
EXAMINER, Sept. 15, 2000, at A4, LEXIS, Cal. General News & Information.
He wrote an open letter to the BSA, in which he suggested that affiliation with
the Scouts was "ethically questionable for judges everywhere." Id.; see also
William C. Duncan, "A Lawyer Class" Views on Marriage and "Sexual
Orientation" in the Legal Profession, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 137, 153-54 (2001).
102. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995) ("[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment [is that] a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message.").
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organization, however, if it were simply required to file a
disclosure statement outlining the portion of the public
accommodations statute from which the organization seeks to
be exempt and a brief, even conclusory, statement of the
organization's policy or core value that serves as the basis for
such an exemption. In effect, the statute would be asking
organizations to anticipate their defense if they were ever sued
under the public accommodations statute and to articulate that
defense before rather than after the fact. For example, the
BSA would declare that it seeks to be exempt from the portion
of the statute that outlaws discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. As the basis for this, the BSA would cite the same
language from the Scout Oath and Law it relied upon in
litigation. 103
The state would not assess or second-guess the
organization's statement of its core values, nor would it
speculate about the likelihood of damage to those core values if
the organization were prevented from discriminating. The
state would accept, at face value, the claim that discrimination
is or might be necessary in order to preserve the organization's
First Amendment right of expressive association. Yoshino's
concern that the Court "simply took the Scouts at its word,
according 'deference to an association's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression' would go unaddressed.10 4 The
statute would, however, reduce one of the negative
consequences of such deference identified by Yoshino-that
keeping an organization's "message" secret can lead individuals
to "invest in an organization they would not have joined had
they known of the 'message.""0 5 The statute would accomplish
something important: People thinking about joining or
contributing to an organization would have a place to go to
determine whether the organization reserves the right to
discriminate on any basis the potential members or donors find
objectionable. In addition, potential members could more
clearly see the organization's policies or values expressed in
that discrimination.
When applied to an organization like the BSA, the
103. Based upon the BSA's recent statement of policy, it is also safe to
assume that the organization would opt out of the portion of the statute
forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion. See supra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text.
104. Yoshino, supra note 1.
105. Id.
2002] 505
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Informed Association Statute would raise some difficult,
interesting questions. How meaningful, after all, is the
disclosure of a potentially discriminatory policy when most of
an organization's members are children? Few if any eight-year-
old boys joining the Cub Scouts could understand a statement
by the BSA that it excludes gay men from membership, or that
it does so in order to uphold rules requiring scouts to be "clean"
and "morally straight." Many eight-year-olds do not know what
"homosexuality" is. 10 6
The probable response to this problem is that the safe-
harbor disclosure would be targeted to parents rather than to
the boys themselves. The parents would decide whether or not
to associate with a potentially discriminatory organization.
Parents and children might disagree, but parents often
overrule their children's wishes "for their own good." Like soda
pop and Pokemon, the Boy Scouts might be chosen by some
children but vetoed by their parents. For other children, the
Boy Scouts might be more like spinach or a good night's sleep:
something the kids would avoid but the parents insist upon.
Indeed, expressive parental decision making can cut both ways:
Supporters of gay rights might pull their boys from scouting
despite the boys' ardent wishes to join.
To permit informed association with the BSA to turn
entirely upon parental consent seems to assume that the
children are incapable of making legitimate, rational decisions
different from their parents on points of conscience. As an
empirical matter this is almost certainly false, particularly as
boys move into adolescence. As a normative matter, the more
an organization claims that an exclusionary policy is part of its
"message," the more difficult it becomes for the organization to
argue coherently that the exclusionary part of the message is
too complex for younger members to understand or ratify. If
106. An informed association statute would appear ridiculous if it rested on
a claim that an eight-year-old boy's association with the BSA can be informed
only if he knows what homosexuality is. To be on the safe side, might
organizations include a definition of the excluded group as part of the safe-
harbor disclosure statement? This would give an organization that
presumptively dislikes or disapproves of a particular group the opportunity to
perpetuate myths or stereotypes about the group. Perhaps the state could
assume some sort of regulatory role to make sure that the disclosures are full
and appropriate. The legislature could enact, as part of the statute, additional
safe-harbor language describing or defining the various groups or
characteristics that might be the subject of discrimination. But language
appropriate for adults would no doubt be puzzling to children and some
adolescents.
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young members are truly incapable of understanding the
exclusionary policy, they cannot possibly be expressing
anything relevant to the policy by joining the organization. If
those young members are capable of understanding the policy
and forming a judgment about it (one would think necessary
prerequisites to expression about it), why not permit them to
choose whether they want to associate? This suggests a
rationale for treating fourteen- to eighteen-year-olds differently
from boys thirteen and under.
CONCLUSION: ESCHEWING SILENCE WITHOUT
FOMENTING ANTI-GAY RHETORIC
To bring his majority opinion in Dale to a close, Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Brandeis to underscore the
importance of "'discovery and spread of political truth"' as First
Amendment values: "'Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, [the Founders of this Nation]
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form."' 10 7 The statute proposed in this Essay would
promote the "spread of political truth." It would permit
organizations and their members to "think as [they] will," but it
would also require them to "speak as [they] think" rather than
concealing their discriminatory policies. 10 8 Such an approach
would protect the associational rights of people who want to
join organizations that discriminate as well as those who wish
to avoid such organizations. If, as the Supreme Court suggests,
the First Amendment effectively grants the BSA a license to
discriminate, the Informed Association Statute would at least
force the BSA to post that license prominently.10 9
A key virtue of the safe-harbor process, moreover, is that
once an organization has disclosed the necessary information, it
need not go out of its way to make anti-gay statements or
continually reaffirm its intention to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation. Potential members can look to the safe-
107. Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (emphasis added) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
108. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won
our independence believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth. ...").
109. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 47-64 (1992);
see also Derrick Bell, The Racial Preference Licensing Act: A Fable About the
Politics of Hate, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 50, 51-54.
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harbor disclosure as the definitive statement of the
organization's policies on the topic and decide whether or not to
associate based on that statement. This prevents an
organization from having it both ways: claiming an intent to
discriminate as defense against subsequent liability under the
public accommodations statute but simultaneously embracing
nondiscrimination norms as a recruitment device." 0  It also
might dampen public anti-gay rhetoric, because organizations
that have complied with the safe-harbor provision would not be
pressured to continually declare their anti-gay policies.
This raises an important empirical issue, of course: Will
the cause of gay rights be promoted when heterosexuals are
forced to be more express and more expressive about their
views on homosexuality? When informed that they belong to a
discriminatory organization, some heterosexuals would no
doubt heave a sigh of relief or utter words of strong approval.
Other heterosexuals-those who support gay people and gay
rights-might mount a challenge to the discriminatory policy
only to find that the organization and the majority of its
members support the policy. Indeed, in response to an attack
on the policy, the organization might take reinforcing action,
for example, by converting an otherwise informal norm into a
codified rule.II The "push back" effect could polarize the
membership of the organization, actually worsening the
position of its closeted gay or lesbian members by bringing anti-
gay sentiment to the surface. The subsequent exit of people
who oppose anti-gay policies could make dialogue and reform
more difficult, as dissenters from the policy would lose insider
status and the access to decision-making power that can come
with it.
On the other hand, supporters of gay rights are disabled
from reforming organizations' anti-gay policies if they lack
information. If members of an organization learn of an anti-
gay policy only after the fact, as many members and supporters
of the Boy Scouts learned about the ban on gay scout leaders
during litigation in Dale, it is very difficult for them to work for
change within the organization. By the time the anti-gay policy
110. See Yoshino, supra note 1.
111. Something similar occurred when President Clinton's announced
intention to lift the ban on gay and lesbian military service members triggered
legislation in Congress converting the rule excluding openly gay or lesbian
service members from a Department of Defense regulation into a federal
statute.
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comes to light in the context of an actual membership dispute,
the organization may have committed itself in ways that make
compromise difficult. Knowledge before the fact could facilitate
repudiation of anti-gay policies as a result of more incremental,
inclusive discussions within the organization. Therefore, the
Informed Association Statute should be viewed as a mechanism
that enables not only exit from discriminatory organizations,
but also dialogue and reform within the organizations.
Inevitably, some battles for reform would be lost, some
won. No organization, however, should be permitted to invoke
First Amendment rights to facilitate the extraction of time,
energy, and financial support from members who, if fully
informed of the organization's discriminatory policies, would
have chosen to devote those resources elsewhere.
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